Blockchains o er a useful abstraction: a trustworthy, decentralized log of totally ordered transactions. Traditional blockchains have problems with scalability and e ciency, preventing their use for many applications.
Introduction
Blockchains are distributed, append-only logs used to lend availability, accountability, and consistency to everything from marketplaces [53] and supply chains [31] to health records [44] and governance [66] . Despite their popularity, blockchain-based applications su er from a fundamental lack of scalability [18] . Interacting applications must be on the same chain, with all their operations both stored and totally ordered by a global mechanism. Fully serialized blockchains are not truly scalable: each consensus mechanism has some maximum speed, regardless of the number of participating machines [18, 40, 50] . As a result, popular chains like Bitcoin [52] and Ethereum are overburdened [29, 37] .
We present Charlo e, a framework for applications built on the blockweb, a novel generalization of blockchains. e blockweb is an authenticated directed acyclic graph [45] of all Charlo e blocks. Whereas blockchains enforce a total ordering on all data, a blockweb requires ordering only when one block references another. Applications can thus create an ordering in the blocks they use, but blocks are by default unordered. is is a natural extension of the database community's decades old "least ordering" ideal [12] .
Reduced serialization requirements make Charlo e fundamentally more e cient. For example, a transaction moving money between bank accounts need only be serialized relative to other transactions on those accounts. Bitcoin's global serialization mechanism takes about an hour [18] , but with Charlo e, transactions can be fast enough to buy a co ee, without resorting to o -chain transactions se led later. Even when operating largely in parallel, we discuss how applications can preserve the serializability properties of traditional blockchains while executing multi-chain transactions, using recursive a estations and meets ( § 4).
Charlo e allows applications to reference each other's blocks, and even to share blocks. For example, our timestamping application ( § 5.4) reads existing blocks and references them with timestamp blocks, demonstrating that each referenced block existed before a given time. Blocks from any other application can be sent to the timestamping servers, without slowing down the application.
Beyond excessive serialization, another problem is that existing blockchains treat all blocks the same way. ey have one mechanism for selecting and storing all blocks.
Unfortunately, no single mechanism suits every application. In an a empt to create consensus mechanisms trustworthy enough for every possible application, existing blockchains have become slow and ine cient [18, 20] . With Charlo e, applications specify requirements for their own blocks.
In Charlo e, data structures are subsets of the blocks in the blockweb, de ned by a estations found in each block reference. As each block is an immutable datum, and references others by hash, blocks form an authenticated directed acyclic graph [33] . However, some applications require more constraints on their data structures. us each block reference may include signed certi cates demonstrating that it belongs in a given data structure. ese may include proofs of retrievability, demonstrating that it was stored properly, as well as proofs of integrity, demonstrating that some applicationspeci c set of servers believe the block belongs in a data structure. For instance, a payment log includes only blocks approved by the payer and requires a total ordering of payments, to protect against double spending. Depending on the application, its data structures may be permissioned, permissionless, or both [15] . One advantage of Charlo e is that principals (or machines) that an application does not trust cannot in uence the application's data structures.
With availability and integrity a estations, Charlo e separates two duties which traditional blockchains con ate: storing blocks, and approving which blocks belong in a structure [47] . Charlo e servers providing storage provide proofs of availability without having to worry about ordering or data structures, and servers providing integrity need not even read whole blocks, streamlining consensus. ese la er servers correspond to consensus servers in a traditional blockchain, also called "orderers" or "miners" [47] . As we have named our framework a er the book Charlo e's Web, availability servers are called Wilbur, a er the character whose goal is to stay alive, and integrity servers are called Fern, a er the character who makes di cult choices [67] .
Contributions
• In §3, we present Charlo e, a blockweb, which allows any application or server to participate concurrently.
• In § 4, we discuss the properties of information in Charlo e, including requirements on how blocks are referenced ( § 4.1) and the resulting properties of blockchains within Charlo e ( § 4.3).
• In § 5, we explain how Charlo e's exibility generalizes existing designs ( § 5.1) and how new kinds of applications can be built e ciently in Charlo e.
• In §6, we describe our prototype implementation.
• In §7, we use this implementation, and real Bitcoin data to compare the e ciency of Charlo e to that of other blockchain systems.
Supply Chain: A Running Example
Suppose a variety of companies want to agree on the history of ownership, including trades and purchases, of the goods they use. ey might want to ensure, for example, that the provenance of an item, or that a limited quantity was produced.
[31] A blockchain provides immutability: each record contains a digest, and thus a commitment, of all the records on which it depends. If a user possesses a record, they can detect any a empted alterations to earlier records. Blockchains also provide availability: each record is traditionally replicated with each "miner, " and so it is di cult to lose commi ed records. It is possible to track supply chains on existing blockchains, such as Ethereum, that are intended for use as application platforms [24] . However, all such platforms use a single chain to track all records. is requires that all records be totally serialized, even when unnecessary. For instance, if one blockchain tracks ownership of , and another tracks ownership of , then they should be able to operate mostly in parallel. A sudden urry of trades should not normally slow down trading . With a single blockchain, however, that's exactly what would happen: trades compete to append their transactions to the chain [29] . is unnecessary ordering may seem minor, but with millions of potential transactions every second, even the fastest consensus systems cannot keep up.
One key insight is that the mechanism for committing a block need not satisfy everyone: just the those involved in the block itself. Charlo e instead allows independent operations on independent servers to simply ignore each other. If A wants to trade to B in exchange for , then any mechanism that both A and B nd agreeable is su cient to commit a block representing such a trade. For example, they might agree on some consortium of servers who can atomically commit the block into their supply chain records. If another trade, featuring di erent commodities and di erent principals, agrees on some unrelated mechanism, there is no harm in those trades proceeding concurrently.
Intuitively, the supply chain system needs:
• A way for A and B to state their requirements, in terms of who they trust to guarantee the uniqueness of and sales, and in terms of where such records must be stored.
• A way for those authorities and storage servers to sign o on such a transaction.
• A way for future transactions to reference this one, carrying a estations of uniqueness and availability.
In a trade, each party may ask for records of the history of ownership of the other party's holdings. If the ownership ancestry records provided by each party are not up to the other's satisfaction, they will need to get their records endorsed by a su ciently trustworthy party. Records can A B AAA CCC Figure 1 . B buys from A , and the record of the sale is a block, B. e rst trade is tracked by the AAA, but B later wishes to prove ownership to C , who does not trust the AAA, and so they get the CCC to endorse the earlier transaction. increase in integrity and availability as more participants agree to store them, or agree to reject con icting records. Suppose that B buys some from A , as depicted in Figure 1 . To ensure the authenticity of the , they atomically commit the change of ownership with the A A A (AAA), a network of -tracking servers. B then has an a estation demonstrating that he owns the , in the eyes of the AAA. Suppose that B later wishes to sell the to C . Naturally, the record of the new transaction should reference the record of the previous transaction (with A and B ), to show a history of ownership. However, C does not trust the AAA to maintain art ownership records. She only trusts the C C C (CCC), a different network of -tracking servers. erefore, before their trade can proceed, they send the record of the previous transaction to the CCC. If the CCC sees no con icts, it adds it to its records, and replies with an a estation to that a ect.
en C can recognize that B owns the . Another key insight is that endorsement is the same as signing o on transactions in the rst place. e type of a eststion the CCC provides is no di erent from the a estation the AAA provides.
Design
Charlo e provides a framework for distributed applications to build their own data structures within the blockweb. Our design is motivated by the following principles:
• We should not force unnecessary ordering: applications that do not interact should run concurrently. 
Label
Availability Policy who will store this block and how they'll prove it
Integrity Policy who will guarantee no con icting blocks, and how they guarantee it Figure 3 . Structure of an Example Block
• Storing blocks and choosing which ones belong in which data structures should be separate duties, performed by separate servers.
• Incentives should be le to applications: servers can a est to any blocks they wish, for whatever reason.
• When reading a data structure, it should be possible to know the inherent trust assumptions: Under what conditions will this data remain available? When might someone read con icting data? • Data should always be able to become more trustworthy, and more available, but never less so.
ere are two types of servers in Charlo e: Wilbur availability servers are key-value stores which store blocks, and Fern integrity servers a est to which blocks belong in which data structures. Together, these servers provide the blockweb: a decentralized data structure with many smaller data structures within it. Applications de ne the structures they wish to work with, and most importantly, specify who must a est to blocks in those structures. ese speci cations effectively de ne the application's failure assumptions: if the application only speci es one speci c server on which to store a block, it assumes that server won't crash. Minting a block within an application involves creating a block with whatever data the application uses, and then sending it to servers that work with the application, so they can a est that it is stored, and that they will not a est to con icting blocks. is process is shown in Figure 2 . Anyone reading the set of su ciently available blocks and selecting those with the appropriate a estations will see all the blocks created for a given application (unless that application's failure assumptions were wrong).
Structure of a Block
Each block is a Merkle Tree [48] . ere are three leaf types:
• Payload leaves are application-speci c data.
• Reference leaves identify another block, and provide a estations as to where the block is stored, and what data structures include it ( § 3.1.1). • Label leaves describe where this block should be stored, what data structures it must be a part of, and who must approve its membership in those data structures ( § 3.1.2). Our implementation speci es the data layout of references and labels ( § 6). e root hash of the tree is used as the key, or unique identi er, of the block. Merkle proofs can demonstrate the presence of a label or reference in a block [48] . Figure 3 shows an example of a block.
Charlo e provides a data format for blocks and for references to blocks. is structure is agnostic to implementationspeci c details such as hash functions and digital signature formats, so servers can specify the formats they use.
Attestations
Each a estation is a promise. Wilbur servers create availability a estations which promise to store a block. Fern servers create integrity a estations which promise not to a est to con icting blocks. A estations can serve as part of evidence of wrongdoing, supporting applications' incentive systems.
Since a estations cannot be created until a er the block is formed (for instance, a Wilbur server cannot store a block until a er the block exists), a estations for a block cannot be stored in the block itself. erefore, each reference to a block must include any relevant a estations. If a block references its predecessor in a chain, for example, it includes a estations demonstrating that the predecessor is su ciently well stored, and uniquely occupies the previous chain slot.
Any reference to a block should demonstrate that at least the block's own label is satis ed. erefore, a reference to a block should include a copy of the label, and a Merkle proof that the label corresponds to the block's root hash. Additional a estations may bolster the block's demonstrated availability and integrity. Figure 4 shows an example of a block reference.
Availability A estations are issued by Wilbur servers. One type, which we have implemented in our prototype, is a signed promise to store a block forever. Charlo e is extensible with respect to proof types, so other types, such as proofs of retrievability [14] , may be added by any servers that support them.
Integrity A estations are issued by Fern servers. For example, if a Fern server in our supply chain application a ests to a block stating that A sold a speci c unit of to B , the Fern server will not a est to any other blocks in which A sells that unit of . One type of a estation, found in our prototype implementation, is a proof of consensus ( §3.2). Consensus participants a est that they will not consent to con icting blocks. All messages in the consensus are signed, and the proof is a collection of the messages sent while achieving consensus. Other conceivable integrity a estations include proofs of work. Unlike a proof of consensus, where the underlying assumption is that a certain portion of the participants are honest, the underlying assumption of a proof of work a estation is that no more hashpower has been used on a di erent block. When looking at all the blocks in a proof of work chain, the most trustworthy attestations are those demonstrating the most hashpower has been applied to a block (or its descendants). is is a natural implementation of the longest chain rule [52] .
The Charlo e framework is extensible: a estations are a tagged union type, so anyone can add application-speci c a estation types as long as their servers know what to do with them. In general, not all servers support all proof types. Applications must be engineered only to ask for proofs from servers that can provide them. Our prototype implementation supports queries and error messages for discovery of available proof types.
Semantically, data of type τ are availability a estations if τ de nes a unique function α τ from a τ to a set of sets of Wilbur servers:
(where W is the set of all Wilbur servers) e a estation A must hold so long as one of the sets in α τ (A) is composed of Wilbur servers who are all behaving correctly. Suppose a client has an a estation A, and queries one Wilbur server from each set in α τ (A). If all the Wilbur servers respond "block not found," then the client has proof of an a estation violation: no set in α τ (A) is composed entirely of correct servers. Denial-of-service a acks in which the server simply does not respond are also possible, although there is work in creating proofs of those as well [28] .
Data of type τ are integrity a estations if τ de nes two unique functions c τ and α τ of types:
(where τ is a type of a estation, and F is the set of all Fern servers) e function c τ de nes which a estations con ict with an a estation, and α τ de nes the set of universes (in terms of which Fern Servers are trustworthy) in which an a estation is safe. Suppose a estation A is of type τ , and a estation A , of type τ , con icts with A. By de nition, this means that c τ (A, A ) = T rue.
e pair (A, A ) constitutes a proof that every set of Fern servers in α τ (A) contains a byzantine server.
We call a estation A stronger than a estation A when A con icts with a superset of the a estations A con icts with, and A holds whenever A holds:
Correct servers do not issue a estations that con ict with a estations that others might make. For instance, our proof of consensus a estations are constructed so that byzantine failures too weak to in uence the consensus that created that a estation cannot create con icting a estations.
Labels
Each block contains exactly one label leaf. is leaf describes which data structures the block is meant to be a part of, and what is necessary for its approval. Speci cally, a label describes the least strong a estations a block requires. In some sense, if a estations are never created satisfying the block's label, the block has failed, and should not be referenced. For instance, in our supply chain example ( § 2), each block representing a trade would have to be approved by the consensus mechanisms tracking the goods involved. Each consensus mechanism is a consortium of distinct principals, which agree together to a est to blocks representing supply chain transactions. Additionally, those consortia might demand that any block they make a permanent part of the record must be stored in a certain way.
us each block's label requires that it be stored in a particular way, and that it be approved by a particular consensus.
Availability Policies
Within a label, availability policies describe possible sets of Wilbur servers which must store a block, as well as what kind of a estation each must provide. One type of policy, found in our implementation, is a set of acceptable sets of Wilbur servers, each identi ed by public key, as well as a speci ed format for each server's a estation.
Integrity Policies
Just as availability policies specify the minimal availability a estations a block requires, integrity policies specify the minimal integrity a estations. An integrity a estation is a statement about what won't be a ested to in the future, so an integrity policy is likewise a statement about what anyone who a ests to this block shouldn't a est to later. In short, it de nes the set of blocks which con ict with this one.
By specifying con icting blocks, integrity policies specify the data structures to which a block will belong. If a data structure is non-exclusive, any block can claim membership: no integrity policy is required. Many data structures, however, require exclusivity: admi ing some blocks precludes others. For instance, a chain consists of a series of slots, each of which may be claimed by only one block. Any two blocks claiming the same slot on the same chain con ict.
Integrity policies must also specify the type of a estation they require ( § 3.1.1). is may include a proof of work, or, as in our implementation, a proof of consensus.
Consensus
For a consensus mechanism to be useful in Charlo e, it must be able to produce a proof of consensus, which is any data type, veri able to an external observer, demonstrating that a speci c consensus decided on a speci c block. In order for a proof of consensus to make any sense, it must specify its participants. A reader must be able to determine under what failure conditions (in terms of which Fern servers might fail), a contradictory proof of consensus might be forged. A proof of consensus can thus form an integrity a estation. A corresponding integrity policy would specify the participants who must achieve consensus.
In general, we want Charlo e blocks to atomically join (or fail to join) all their data structures together. e integrity policy should require a single, atomic consensus mechanism that satis es the constraints of all the data structures to which the block belongs. For example, in our supply chain application ( § 2), suppose a block details an exchange of for . It would be awkward if the data structure tracking accepted the block, but not the data structure for . When two integrity policies are combined into a single policy, such that all a estations satisfying the uni ed policy satisfy both original ones, we call that a meet ( § 4.1).
For consensus-based integrity policies to have a meet, the consensus mechanism must have a way to bring together the participants of both sub-policies. is meet consensus mechanism should only be able to issue contradictory proofs of consensus when the consensus mechanisms of both subpolicies are likewise compromised.
One such mechanism, provided in our prototype, is a byzantine Paxos-based consensus description, where each data structure dictates quorums required for approval, and the block can only be approved by a set of Fern servers including a quorum from each data structure [35] . Other consensus mechanisms, such as Stellar [46] , have a concept of meet as well. We are not aware, however, of another consensus implementation that creates a proof of consensus.
Structure of a Reference
Each block reference features the block's root hash, which uniquely identi es the block. It also includes a set of attestations, allowing anyone retrieving the block to know where the block may be found, how available it is, and which data structures it is part of. Finally, it features the block's label ( § 3.1.2), and a Merkle proof that the label matches the root. Figure 4 is a diagram of a block reference.
Chains
Many Charlo e applications, including in our prototype implementation, will wish to implement a blockchain. A blockchain, broadly de ned, is any path through the blockweb. However, it is convenient to specify a few more qualities usually implied by blockchains, and a natural way to represent them in Charlo e. is is what we mean by blockchain: A blockchain can be identi ed by a unique root block. is is simply the block in the chain that has no predecessors. A chain must also have a label representing how blocks in the chain must be stored, and what a estations are required for the uniqueness of each block. e natural label to use is the label of the root itself.
us the root satis es the requirements of the blocks in the chain, and whoever issues a estations for the root acknowledges that the chain exists when a esting to the root.
Blocks can be in multiple chains. Each block in a chain references both the previous block and the root of the chain. It must also have a label that is at least as strong as that of each of its roots. Integrity labels and a estations can be application-speci c, so it is up to Fern servers to verify that they understand the labels involved, and have checked their relative strength. Furthermore, as chains are totally ordered, a block should specify what position it takes in each chain, in terms of "distance from the root. " We call this distance a slot, and integrity a estations for chains vow not to approve any two block with the same slot on the same chain. Figure 5 features two blockchains sharing a block.
In general, chains do not ll later slots before earlier ones. A natural representation is to use natural numbers as slots (number of blocks from root). By requiring each block to reference its immediate predecessor (and valid references include a estations that the predecessor is unique), we can guarantee that earlier slots are lled before later ones.
Entanglement
Entanglement occurs when di erent applications interact. Because each block contains a hash that uniquely identi es its ancestry, a empts to change old blocks become harder to cover up when they have more diverse descendants. If, for example, many applications' blocks reference old timestamps (to show they were created a er a given time), and in turn are later timestamped, then a er a while, all these applications' new blocks would be descendants of all these applications' old blocks. eir chains become entangled. It would be impossible for an adversary to change the old records of one application without changing records of all the applications.
Incentives
Charlo e does not specify why Fern or Wilbur servers choose to a est to certain blocks. is is, in general, speci c to an application. For instance, if a company runs a blockchain for their own use, they may run their own Fern and Wilbur servers, which operate over all blocks signed by company so ware. It is also possible to run for-pay Fern or Wilbur servers. For instance, a server might choose only to a est to blocks that include in their payload a transfer of funds to the server's owner (see §5.3 for how one might implement funding transfers). We hope to see many incentive schemes implemented in Charlo e.
Consistency Properties
Most existing blockchains rely on the serializable consistency [54] of their transactions for critical properties [24, 52] .
e programming model o ered by serializable transactions has proven a ractive to Blockchain users. With no requirement for total serialization, Chartlo e does not inherently have this property. However, Charlo e can, in general, guarantee causal consistency [10, 19, 42] . Furthermore, subgraphs of Charlo e, such as chains described in §4.3, can guarantee serializable consistency. is is true even for data spanning multiple such chains.
Moreover, we can demonstrate that, unlike most permissionless blockchains, data structures in Charlo e maintain availability and integrity properties speci ed in their labels, reliant only on the Wilbur and Fern servers they trust 1 . Untrusted adversaries can have no e ect on them.
Joins and Meets
To describe Charlo e's consistency properties, it is useful to consider the possible universes in which the system may be operating. For our purposes, each universe is characterized by the set of servers which have not violated their a estations. For instance, if we are living in a universe where all the servers have violated their a estations, then none of the guarantees implied by block labels hold, since no a estations can be trusted anyway.
Intuitively, availability a estations describe the set of possible universes under which a block is still available. Likewise, integrity a estations describe the set of possible universes in which no con icting block can be endorsed by equivalent a estations. For an a estation A, we refer to this set of universes as α(A).
For instance, if a Wilbur server W 1 a ests to a block B, then in all universes where W 1 holds true to its a estation, B remains available. Likewise, if a Fern server F 1 a ests to a block B, then in all universes where F 1 is honest, no block con icting with B will have an a estation from F 1 .
We consider an a estation to be stronger than another if it describes a superset of possible universes, and equivalent if it describes the same set. Conversely, a stronger a estation fails in a subset of the universes in which a weaker a estation fails. When a block has multiple a estations, we can consider their join ( ): a compound a estation representing the universes in which at least one of the a estations holds.
(sometimes wri en a a := {a, a } for two a estations) us we consider one set of availability a estations A stronger than another set A when the join of A is stronger than the join of A . Likewise, we consider one set of integrity a estations I stronger than another set I when the join of I is stronger than the join of I .
We can also consider the compound a estation representing the set of universes where all of the a estations in a set hold. We call this the meet ( ) of the set:
(sometimes wri en a a := {a, a } for two a estations.) For blocks, we want to consider the set of universes in which they are both available and no con icting blocks have equivalent or stronger a estations. For a block B with availability a estations A, and integrity a estations I :
For instance, suppose A and B are minting a block together.
ey get availability a estations from Wilbur servers W 1 ,W 2 , and W 3 , and integrity a estations from Fern servers F 1 , F 2 , and F 3 . In all universes where W 1 ,W 2 , or W 3 are live and trustworthy, the block will remain available. Furthermore, so long as F 1 , F 2 , or F 3 are trustworthy, no con icting block can get equivalent or stronger a estations. When we consider α for proofs of work, each universe is still characterized by the set of trustworthy a estations: in this case, the set of proofs such that no equal or longer conicting proof of work exists. us longer proofs of work are equivalent to more a estations.
Blocks with a superset of a estations are more available, or more trustworthy, than other blocks. For instance, suppose block B 1 is endorsed by Fern server F 1 , but block B 2 is endorsed by Fern servers F 1 and F 2 . If F 1 is dishonest, then blocks con icting with B 1 might also have F 1 a estations: no client would have reason to prefer B 1 over those con icting blocks. erefore, we say B 2 has stronger integrity, because only when F 1 and F 2 are dishonest can B 2 be contradicted by a block with equivalent a estations. Note that many attestations are incomparable: if B 3 has a estations from Fern servers F 2 and F 3 , then should B 2 and B 3 con ict, Charlo e sets no precedent as to which is "preferable. "
When considering multiple blocks, we can talk about the set of universes in which both are available and uncontradicted. is is precisely when at least one availability a estation of each features an honest and live Wilbur server, and at least one integrity a estation for each is from an honest Fern server. us the meet ( ) of a set of blocks B is de ned exactly like the meet of a set of a estations.
Likewise, we can talk about the set of universes where at least one block is available and uncontradicted. us the join ( ) of a set of blocks B is de ned exactly like the join of a set of a estations.
Join and meet for references are de ned exactly as for blocks. We can even de ne α, join, and meet for labels. For a label , let R be the set of all possible references featuring a estations satisfying :
Intuitively, the set of universes in which a label is violated includes any universe where any reference satisfying that label is violated. Join and meet are then de ned for labels exactly as they are for blocks and references.
Causal Consistency
Causal consistency, intuitively, is the requirement that in any view of a system, if an e ect of an event is visible, then so are the e ects of any logical causes of that event [10, 19, 42] . In Charlo e, we think of each block as an event, and each block it references as a logical cause. Each reference carries a estations that the blocks referenced are available and approved members of their respective data structures. e DAG structure of the blockweb guarantees no cyclic causality. At a very basic level, causal consistency is assured.
However, in Charlo e, the notion of event "visibility" is not so clear-cut. Di erent blocks may have di erent levels of availability and integrity. When, for instance, one set of Wilbur servers crash, some blocks may become unavailable, but not others. erefore, we de ne two notions:
• e recursive availability of a block is the availability of that block, joined with the recursive availability of the blocks it references. is may be thought of as the set of circumstances (in terms of which Wilbur servers hold to their a estations) under which the block's entire ancestry is available.
• e recursive integrity of a block is the integrity of the block, joined with the recursive integrity of each block it references. is may be thought of as the set of circumstances (in terms of which integrity a estations are violated) under which no block is approved, which con icts with any block in the ancestry. us, the causal consistency of any block is assured precisely when the block's recursive availability and recursive integrity hold.
As time goes on, and ancestries of new blocks grow larger, it may seem that recursive integrity and recursive availability of blocks would naturally become weaker. However, each time a new block is approved, Fern and Wilbur servers may add new a estations to those it references. In fact, some applications may specify recursive a estations, which are a short-hand for listing an a estation for each block in the given block's ancestry. For instance, a proof of work a estation demonstrates that a certain amount of hash-reversing power is necessary to approve a con icting block. Because the block contains hash roots of those it references, that amount of hash-reversing power would also be necessary to approve blocks con icting with those referenced. Since additional hash-power is added each time a new descendant is minted, it is possible to construct ever-stronger a estations of old blocks as time goes on.
If an application considers its Fern servers to implicitly approve a block's ancestry each time they approve a block, then a block's recursive integrity is exactly its own integrity. Furthermore, if an application stores all elements of a block's ancestry in the same way as it stores the block itself, then the block's recursive availability is the same as its availability. If an application does both, then a block's causal consistency is assured whenever the block's labels hold.
Charlo e does not have an explicit requirement that all a estations are recursive in this way, because some applications may not bene t from such a thing ( § 5.4). Furthermore, some applications may consider some historical blocks more "important" than other historical blocks. For example, with the timestamping application ( § 5.4), blocks referencing a timestamp have all manner of unrelated ancestors, since timestamp blocks can reference blocks from any application. For such applications, the relevant consistency properties will have to do with recursive availability or integrity restricted to the set of blocks they consider important.
Causal consistency alone is su cient for some applications. However, other applications may want the full serializability provided by traditional blockchains.
Chain Properties
When a chain is constructed according to §3.4, blocks have a serializable consistency property [54] . In all universes speci ed by the label of the root block of the chain, the blocks have a serial order de ned by their slots. We say that a property holds up to a label when it holds in all universes described by that label. erefore, we say that blockchains are serializable up to the label of the chain.
For every block B, all other blocks sharing a chain with B are serialized either before B (they are ancestors of B), or a er B (they are descendants of B). is property holds up to the meet of the labels of the chains B and the other block share. at is to say, if B and B are both on a chain C, and Fern servers have not issued two contradictory a estations for C, then B and B are ordered. Since the a estations of all blocks in a chain are bounded by the chain's label, the blocks of a chain are serialized up to the label of the chain.
If a set of blocks share multiple chains, they are serialized so long as one of the chains they share is serialized. A set of blocks is serialized up to the join of the labels of the chains they all share.
Chains as Objects
We can view each chain as a stateful object. Each block represents achange to that state. At the lowest level, the object's state is simply the chain itself, but applications may parse it to something more useful. For example, a chain representing an account balance could list balance changes in each block, and an application might read the account balance as the sum of all the account changes.
When all the blocks in the chain are available, the object's state can be said to be available. erefore the object's availability is bounded by the meet of the blocks in the chain, which is in turn bounded by the label of the chain. e object is at least as available as the label of the chain indicates.
Likewise, when no a estation has been improperly issued for a block on the chain (such as if there's a con icting block in the same slot), the object's state is consistent: all readers will see the same chain. e object's integrity is therefore bounded by the label of the chain.
Blocks as Transactions
Each block can be on multiple chains. In this object model, each transaction reads data from some chains, and writes data to some chains. We represent each transaction as a block that is appended to all the chains it reads or writes. In this model, our design for blockchains within Charlotte corresponds exactly to a serializable, atomic transaction system, a popular programming abstraction [27, 54] .
Each block can be seen as "locking" all relevant chains, forcing all other operations to be scheduled either before or a er the block. e label of a chain bounds the object's availability, and integrity (an object loses integrity if it loses serializability). In this light, Charlo e is a generalization of distributed, federated object stores [32, 39] .
Applications
Charlo e facilitates more exible application designs than existing blockchain systems can support. More Charlo e applications are described in Appendix A.
Simulating Existing Chains
Charlo e is generic enough to faithfully emulate almost all existing blockchains and blockchain-like systems. For instance, one could implement "Charlo eBitcoin" with blocks featuring the same payload as Bitcoin blocks, and proofs-ofwork as integrity a estations. Bitcoin's peer-to-peer block distribution network provides, in e ect, very weak availability a estations. Charlo eBitcoin could hold Wilbur servers accountable when they do not store blocks properly, since availability a estations can be used as proof of wrongdoing, and incentive systems could punish misbehaving servers.
Systems like Iota [56] , Nano [38] , and Spectre [62] do not each strictly keep a chain of blocks. Nevertheless, their block payloads could be forma ed as Charlo e blocks, and reference multiple priors.
Object Model
As discussed in § 4.3, we can think of chains in Charlo e as stateful objects, and each block as an atomic transaction.
e labels of the chains represent availability and integrity guarantees for the objects. Blocks, in this light, represent serializable transactions.
is can be a helpful model for Charlo e applications.
As in Ethereum, it is possible to place programs and object state digests in each block. While this is sometimes useful, it is not always necessary. So long as the application can derive the state of an object from the payload of blocks on its chain, and each transaction is a block on all the chains it reads or writes from, the transactions are serializable.
Supply Chain
Our Supply Chain example application ( § 2) features an object for each instance of an organization tracking a type of commodity. Each block details a transfer of ownership, creation, or destruction of a commodity. Likely, one would want to have each block signed by any commodity owners involved.
When C wants to trade to D in exchange for , they execute an atomic transaction on the objects maintained by mutually agreeable commodities trackers. Suppose these are the Canadian Co ee Catalogue (CCC), and the Danish Diamond Directory (DDD). e transaction should thus be logged on both the CCC's object, and the DDD's object.
Con icts & Perceived Serializability
Any party wishing to maintain a serializable view of the world need only commit every transaction it cares about to its own object, a er examining the transaction's ancestry for con icts with known history. For example, suppose that C and the CCC are malicious, and C logs many sales of , citing as her source each time the same unit, which she purchased only once. A er D logs the purchase with the DDD, the DDD's records link C 's purchase with the sale of that to D . Assuming the DDD is appropriately checking the history of the goods in the transactions it commits, it will not accept any other transactions featuring a di erent sale of the same unit of anywhere in their history. From the DDD's perspective, that was only sold once. e serializability safety property is assured, from the DDD's perspective. If the CCC a ests to other transactions in which that was sold other times, the DDD simply will not accept any child blocks of those transactions.
Accepting transactions from untrustworthy sources (like the CCC) can thus be a danger to liveness. To avoid locking itself out of potential future transactions (in essence having a di erent view of history from the other commodities traders) it is in the DDD's best interest to share any transactions it knows about, and get other principals to a est to them. is should not be surprising: spreading the news of a sale helps to prevent double-selling. For a similar reason, existing blockchain systems o en gossip blocks between storage nodes [52] . Charlo e provides the means to do so (servers can submit blocks to other servers, just like anyone else), but does not bake in any particular gossip requirement. Applications are free to implement whatever best suits their needs. Even when a malicious server successfully a ests to two con icting transactions, anyone discovering the two possesses evidence of duplicitousness, and an incentive system (such as law enforcement) may be able to limit the damage.
Banking
Many existing blockchain applications implement currency transfers, the traditional domain of banks [24, 46, 52, 60] . Charlo e's object model ( § 5.2) provides a natural implementation for banking. Each bank account is an object, with a label dictating what Wilbur servers the account owner trusts to keep the account available, and what servers the account owner trusts to a est only to non-fraudulent transfers.
e label describes exactly who the account owner trusts to be a bank. e advantage over traditional banking, however, is that account owners do not have to place all their trust in one organization. For example, an account might set its label to be the meet ( § 4.1) of a label representing an account at one bank, and a label representing an account at another bank. en the account can be defrauded only if two banks are fraudulent (at the expense of losing the ability to make transactions if either bank crashes). In fact, anyone can provide Fern and Wilbur servers, and account owners are free to set whatever label parameters they trust, making it easy to e ectively create new banks.
Timestamping
While the authenticated DAG structure of the blockweb provides proof of whether blocks were created before or a er other blocks, a timestamping service provides evidence of whether a block was created before or a er a given clock time. Our timestamping application is an example of an application outside the Object Model. It can take greater advantage of Charlo e's decentralized features. In fact, it does not explicitly form blockchains at all.
A timestamping server simply issues a signed block stating the present time, and referencing other blocks as "before that time." e timestamp's availability is set by availability a estations, but it needs no integrity a estation. Any block the timestamp references is, if the timestamper is to be believed, provably created before that time. Likewise, any block referencing the timestamp was created a er that time. Blocks can reference or be referenced by blocks issued by multiple timestamping servers, to increase the trustworthiness of their timing claims.
Transitivity
Timestamping is transitive. Any ancestors of a timestamp are before that time, and any descendants are a er it. It is possible to construct a recursive a estation ( § 3.1.1) for any ancestor of a timestamp block. e timestamp server a ests that none of them will have as ancestors a timestamp block with a later time (from the same server).
Each timestamp block may have limited space to reference all the blocks which want to be timestamped. Blocks willing to have a slightly later timestamp may agree to be referenced by another block, in e ect a timestamp reseller, which is then referenced by the timestamp. If applications regularly arrange for their blocks to be descendants and ancestors of timestamps (preferably multiple timestamps), then Charlo e as a whole will gather a high degree of entanglement ( § 3.5).
Timestamping Implementation
We implemented our timestamping application on top of 4 Wilbur servers. Each server issues a timestamp block whenever it has stored 10 new blocks. It then sends the new timestamp block to all the other servers. A single client sent thousands of unique blocks to each server, and we timed how long it took for each to become the ancestor of timestamp blocks from at least 3 timestamping servers.
We compare to a more traditional blockchain, which completely serializes all blocks.
is also provides a kind of timestamping, as each round of consensus includes a timestamp endorsed by the participating Fern servers. Indeed, existing services use existing blockchains as reliable timestamps [25, 26, 65] . In our experiment, each block was approved by a 3-out-of-4 byzantine tolerant consensus, and we timed how long it took to append each block to the chain:
System
Blocks Latency StdDev Xput Timestamping 9638 0.2502s 0.0772s 229/s Blockchain 120 2.72s 0.31s 0.37/s By eschewing traditional blockchain design, our timestamping application has signi cantly be er throughput and latency. What's more, it requires only that the timestamping servers can reference the blocks being timestamped. ey do not have to interfere at all with other applications. For instance, our timestamping service can run on the storage nodes of our object model blockchains, providing each block with timestamps, with no measurable slowdown to the chains. Because our timestamping servers issue timestamps only when they have enough new blocks, the slower pace of the chains did slow down the rate of timestamping.
Implementation
We have implemented a proof-of-concept version of Charlo e, and both timestamping ( § 5.4) and object model ( § 5.2) applications. We implemented a standard block format and an API for Fern and Wilbur servers in Apache ri , a datatype and network API language [4, 61] . ri supports encoding, decoding, and network communication in a wide variety of programming langauges [4] . e speci cation comprises 473 lines of ri code, excluding comments, whitespace, and closing braces.
We implemented Wilbur and Fern servers in Haskell [22] . Excluding comments, whitespace, and import statements, our Wilbur implementation is 597 lines of code. Our Fern implementation is 1057 lines of Haskell, including machinery speci c to dealing with chains as de ned in § 3.4. Each principal is identi ed by a 1024-bit RSA X509 certi cate [30, 58] .
Our Fern servers run a novel consensus algorithm based on byzantine Paxos [35, 36] . It has two features useful for Charlo e, which we have not found elsewhere:
• It produces a proof of consensus ( § 3.2).
• It has a notion of a consensus speci cation (an integrity label), as well as meets and joins ( § 4.1) on those speci cations, allowing it to enforce chain properties with multi-chain blocks ( § 4.3). Intuitively, the quorums for the meet consensus speci cation each feature one quorum from each of the labels' specications.
e consensus implementation itself, excluding comments, whitespace, and imports, is 1796 lines of Haskell.
Experimental Setup
We ran sample chains on a cluster managed by Eucalyptus [2] (so ware meant to simulate Amazon's cloud computing infrastructure [3] ). Each machine has two 8-core Intel Xeon E5-2690 2.9 GHz CPUs [1] . e servers are connected by 10 GBit Ethernet. Each of our servers was on a separate VM 2 , shown in the following The experiment client mints and submits blocks for all the chains. Each block is begun as soon as a estations are available for references to the previous blocks.
Fern servers run a 4-participant consensus tolerating 1 byzantine failure for each chain.
Wilbur servers each store blocks for a speci c chain. Each chain has 4 servers, and blocks must be stored on 3.
Performance
We ran a series of experiments to demonstrate the viability of applications using the Object Model ( § 5.2). Each experiment begins with a root block for each chain. We append a block to all chains together, 12 times in a row. We repeated this experiment 10 times for 1, 2, and 3 chains. e mean times to append each of the 120 blocks are in the following While these results are not fast, they are more than sucient to demonstrate simple blockchains. We believe much faster performance is possible with more optimized parsing and consensus.
Discussion
We believe much faster implementations of Charlo e are possible with additional engineering e ort. Pro ling reveals that the current prototype spends a signi cant portion of its CPU time marshaling and unmarshaling data. Our prototype implementation uses the ri marshaling and RPC system [4, 61] . We created a microbenchmark to test the relative performance of the similar RPC system gRPC [8] using Protobufs [9] . For our message sizes, gRPC moves structured data 20-30× faster; even with no other changes, a reimplementation based on Protobufs should yield subsecond multichain transaction times.
Marshaling is a dominant factor in part because our consensus algorithm leads to large message sizes. Fortunately, these message sizes could be brought down substantially by removing redundancy. For example, to simplify construction of proofs of consensus, each message in our consensus system carries the original proposed value, which does not need to be retransmi ed with every message.
Other small improvements, including selecting more compact cryptographic ids and signatures, and representing integrity labels less verbosely, could improve our implementation. While Haskell yields concise, clear code, a performanceoriented implementation might choose di erently. Figure 6 . Payment data from Bitcoin's rst 200,000 blocks (We were unable to evaluate our prototype on transactions of arbitrarily many accounts.)
Evaluation
We evaluate the potential e ciency savings of Charlo e on a payment network by analyzing rst 200,000 of the real Bitcoin transaction history [5] . Our measurements are based on our prototype implementation, which has been tested running chains in our object model ( § 5.2).
Our Charlo e banking model is based on our object model: each bank account is a chain. is presents some di culty in direct comparison to Bitcoin, as Bitcoin doesn't keep track of money in terms of accounts. Instead, each transaction divides all its money into a number of outputs, each of which specify the conditions under which they can be spent (such as need a signature matching a speci c public key. . . ). ese are called Unspent Transaction Outputs, or UTXOs. Each transaction speci es a set of input UTXOs as well, from whence it gets the money, and provides for each a proof that it is authorized to spend the money. Each UTXO is completely drained when it is spent, and cannot be re-used.
us the transactions in Bitcoin form a graph, with transactions as vertices, and UTXOs as directed edges [52] .
In Charlo e, transactions need only be approved by the servers speci ed by the participants. ese are likely to be a handful of bank servers (enough to tolerate a small number of failures), executing a consensus protocol. Paxos-based protocols, like our implementation, have a 3-message latency for commit, absent con icting commits. By contrast, Bitcoin requires at least 6 instances of gossiping blocks through the entire network to commit securely, and each instance requires many message sends [52] . With only a few servers running consensus for each transaction, Charlo e would also consume several orders of magnitude less energy than a proof-of-work based blockchain [20] .
communication / TX energy / TX Machines 3 message sends ∼ 3000000 kJ ∼ 50, 000 6 gossip instances ∼ 30 kJ ∼ 5 / bank
In our Charlo e banking model, transfers between two accounts are simply a block on both chains. erefore, so far as two sets of nancial transactions don't interact, they can operate entirely in parallel. e time it takes to make all the payments in the dataset is therefore the maximum time it takes to make the payments corresponding to any single path through the payment graph. is path of payments, each referencing the previous, corresponds to a chain of blocks. If all transactions are between exactly two accounts, and it always takes the same amount of time to append a block to two chains, then the time it takes to make the longest chain, and thus the time it takes to make all the payments in the dataset, is proportional to the length of the longest path.
e speed analysis of Charlo e's parallelized versus Bitcoin's serialized approaches is in Figure 6 . In principle, Charlo e only needs time to order 1.59% of the transactions Bitcoin orders. If they commit transactions at the same rate, our Charlo e banking design would take 1.59% of the time Bitcoin would to complete a group of payments.
However, that assumes each transaction takes the same amount of time to commit. In Bitcoin, it improves anonymity and performance to combine many small transfers of money into big ones, with many inputs and many outputs. However, in Charlo e, more accounts means more servers trying to achieve consensus. In most consensus implementations, more participants make consensus substantially slower [40, 50] ; our implementation is no exception.
In the American nancial system, all monetary transfers are from one account to another. Blocks are e ectively limited to two chains each. We can simulate this limitation by refactoring each Bitcoin transaction as a DAG of transactions with depth logarithmic in the number of participants (see Appendix B).
e speed analysis for this construction is in Figure 6 , in the "2 Accounts" column. If Charlo e commi ed transactions at the same speed Bitcoin does, it would take only 3.51% of the time that Bitcoin takes to commit a group of transactions, even a er refactoring the transactions.
However, Charlo e's transactions need only satisfy the requirements of the bank accounts involved, allowing them to specify faster consensus mechanisms. Even with our unoptimized proof-of-concept implementation, with each chain running a 4-participant byzantine-tolerant consensus among its Fern servers, we append a block to two chains in 15.7±0.2 seconds. What took the Bitcoin system 3.72 years would thus take Charlo e 44.32 days, a mere 3.29% of Bitcoin's time. We believe that faster consensus implementations are possible, allowing Charlo e to become even more e cient.
Related Work
Although the original Bitcoin protocol o ers limited support for smart contracts [52, 59] , far more developers have ocked to Ethereum's general-purpose platform for communicating applications [21, 24] . Unlike Bitcoin and Ethereum, however, Charlo e does not constrain all blocks to be in one chain, leaving applications free of unnecessary serialization, and free to use less expensive consensus mechanisms.
Charlo e is not the rst blockchain project to propose separating availability and integrity servers. StorJ [68] and Filecoin [34] separate the notion of the blockchain itself entirely from the data being stored. BigchainDB [47] , however, separates its byzantine-tolerant transaction ordering service from the underlying storage for those transactions, for which it uses MongoDB [55] . Charlo e takes this one step further, allowing blocks of arbitrary size (even for le storage) to be stored on Wilbur servers, without requiring that Fern servers see whole blocks at all.
Unchained blocks: Several current projects involve adapting blockchains into non-chain structures. Spectre [62] , Iota [56, 57] , and Nano (a.k.a. Raiblocks) [38] are each DAGs of blocks supporting a cryptocurrency, but are not general application frameworks.
Several projects endeavor to provide the illusion of a single chain, while dividing the work amongst several shards. Elastico is a sharded proof-of-work chain which divides miners into semi-independent shards to be uni ed each "epoch" [43] . Ethereum is considering ways to shard its workload to handle more throughput [23] . Zilliqa is a sharded blockchain in testing [63] . It is in many ways like Ethereum, although it still requires full nodes storing all global state, and each transaction must be parallelizable across a ected shards. All of these projects rely on a global, proof-of-work based miner membership scheme, and a empt to distribute work automatically. Charlo e allows applications to choose more scalable storage and consensus schemes, and provides a principled framework in which di erent chains can interoperate.
Integrity meets: To append a block to multiple Charlo e chains, the new block requires integrity a estations satisfying both chains. While it is possible to seek approval for each separately, this runs the risk that one chain will approve the block, while the other will approve a con icting block, leaving the rst chain stuck. Charlo e solves this problem precisely when the integrity policies of both chains have a meet, or "least upper bound, " which is a new integrity policy satisfying both ( § 4.1). is concept is akin to the integrity necessary to write multiple information-ow labeled objects [51] . e consensus we use in our proof-of-concept implementation has meets, and so a single consensus for both chains is run whenever we append a block to two chains, and the block is approved for both, or neither.
Other systems face the challenge of merging data at di erent integrity levels, with various solutions. Projects building sharded blockchains discuss strategies for inter-shard transactions, many of which can be used in Charlo e [24, 63] . To our knowledge, none have implemented them. Some, such as Elastico [43] , avoid the problem by trusting shards equally, and focusing solely on a crypto-currency designed so inter-shard transactions are unnecessary. e interledger protocol [64] uses a kind of 2-phase commit [13] to atomically commit a transaction to multiple chains. e advantage of this technique is that it works for almost any consensus mechanism on each chain. e disadvantage is that each chain must have some way to interpret the special transactions which the protocol uses, and it takes at least two rounds of consensus on each chain to commit. For these reasons, such a protocol could be used on Charlo e chains, but sometimes more convenient integrity meets may be available.
Conclusion
Charlo e is a decentralized blockweb, to which anyone can contribute blocks, servers, and applications. Since each block's approval process only has to satisfy the parties involved, no expensive global consensus mechanism is required. Combined with avoiding unnecessary serialization, this means Charlo e applications can run far faster and more e ciently than their traditional blockchain counterparts, while retaining many of the same guarantees. Since the duties of availability and integrity are separated, more specialized services can more e ciently cater to each. e extensible format of Charlo e blocks allows each application to use whichever consensus mechanism or availability a estation it wants. is makes it an ideal framework in which to build new blockchains, both experimental and industrial. We plan to release the source code of our proof-ofconcept servers, which we hope will bootstrap the adoption of the blockweb.
A Additional Applications

A.1 Version Control
Version control systems such as Git [17] already maintain commits, or versions of the codebase, as a DAG. Each commit references whatever prior commits it was based on. In Git, a commit with multiple references is called a "merge. " ese systems have no inherent limit to who can mint blocks, or with what predecessors. Two things require agreement:
• Pushing a commit to a server, in which case the server must choose to accept it, in essence promising to provide that commit to others, when requested.
• Designating a commit as part of a branch, mutable names each machine assigns to one commit at a time.
ese two correspond exactly to the a estations of Wilbur and Fern servers. e former is simply block storage, while in the la er, branches correspond to a estations ( § 3.1.1). When a machine a ests that one commit is its latest choice for a branch, that commit must refer to its previous choice. Each time it assigns a new commit to a branch, it a ests never to assign a di erent commit to that branch, unless this one is in its ancestry. In fact, while the duties of the two are usually shared by the same machines (e.g. github [7] Figure 7 . Converting 4 inputs and 4 outputs to a graph of 2-account transactions.
other applications referencing commits or branches need no version-control-speci c mechanism to do so.
A.2 Medical Records
Several recent blockchain e orts are focused on medical records [11, 41, 44, 49] . Here again, there is no need for total serialization of all records. One simple model might be to make each record an object, maintained by Fern and Wilbur servers of the patient's choice. Doctors authorized by the patient or relevant authorities contribute transactions to the object. is would mimic the existing USA medical record system, in which the authoritative record for a patient is kept by their "primary physician" [16] . e primary physician's record-keeping duties would simply be made electronic. Like our version control example ( § A.1), supervising doctors or hospitals could a est to certain records, indicating that they were kept properly.
is allows automatic enforcement of some policies, such as allowing some nurses to prescribe medication if a doctor signs o on it.
B Bitcoin Transactions in Two Accounts or Less
In Bitcoin, it is advantageous to combine many small transfers of money into big ones, with many inputs and many outputs. is improves anonymity and performance. In the real nancial system of the USA, however, all monetary transfers are from one account to another. ey are all exactly two chain transactions. We can simulate this limitation by refactoring each Bitcoin UTXO as 2 UTXOs, and each Bitcoin transaction as a DAG of transactions with depth: , and:
e outputs of C i d go to the UTXOs corresponding with output i, and output i + 2 d −1 mod n. Each transaction divides its output values proportionately to the sums of the nal output values reachable from each of the transaction's outputs. Figure 7 is an example transformation from a 4-input, 4-output transaction to a DAG of depth 2 using all 2-input, 2-output transactions.
